A natural experiment is used to identify the causal relationship between employment protection legislation and …rm growth in Sweden.
and Henrekson, 2002; Sappington and Sidak, 2003) . Empirical evidence on whether these possible growth barriers a¤ect growth comes primarily from cross-country studies (Davis and Henreksson, 1999) , or surveys (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Aidis, 2005; Robson and Obeng, 2008) .
Cross-country studies typically suggest that institutional factors, such as employment-protection legislation and credit-market regulations, may explain why certain countries have more rapidly-growing …rms than do others.
However, these studies su¤er from an omitted variable problem since unmeasured factors correlated with the independent variables might be the true causal factors driving the results. It is also di¢ cult to create comparable cross-country indices of institutional di¤erences (Howell et al., 2007) .
Surveys have typically found that perceived growth barriers (stated preferences) are common (Aidis, 2005) , but they can not provide evidence on actual barriers (revealed preferences). It is well known that studies on stated preferences have problems with hypothetical biases, i.e., that respondents misrepresent their perceived values (List and Gallet, 2001) . Firms might thus state that certain institutional conditions prevent them from hiring employees when in fact they are not so important. Surveys are also most often based on small unrepresentative samples (Coad and Tamvada, 2012) .
We take a di¤erent approach by using a natural experiment in Sweden to investigate the e¤ect of one possible barrier, the strictness of employmentprotection legislation, on …rm-growth. Natural experiments have seldom been used in the …rm growth literature, although it has been recognized that they are ideal for identifying causal e¤ects (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). The idea is that a natural experiment mimics a randomized trial by changing the variable of interest, while keeping control variables constant (Angrist and Lavy, 1999) .
Sweden has one of the strictest employment-protection legislation in the world (OECD, 1994) , with an uncommon detail (also enforced in the Netherlands), being the so-called last-in-…rst-out principle (Skedinger, 2008) . In case of redundancies, this principle states that …rms must dismiss the lasthired employee …rst. This may keep …rms from hiring more employees, because it is costly to revoke a bad recruitment decision. It may also protect insiders in the labor market, possibly explaining why high unemployment tends to persist (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989, 1991) .
In 2001, a reform was enacted in Sweden that made it possible for …rms with less than eleven employees to exclude two of them from the …rst-inlast-out principle. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach on a longitudinal …rm-level data-set, covering all limited liability …rms in Sweden during [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , and utilizing this change in the employment-protection legislation across …rm size and time, we can identify the e¤ect of the last-in-…rst-out principle on employment growth.
We assume that the average outcome for …rms just above the sizethreshold (i.e., above 10 employees) represents a valid control group for our treatment group (9 employees or less) 1 . One concern is the endogeneity of the treatment status, i.e., that …rms would select themselves into the treatment group before the reform was implemented. It is, however, unlikely that this reform was anticipated by Swedish …rms, since it was only decided upon in late 2000 (Lindbeck et al., 2006) . It was also unclear how many workers would be excluded from the last-in-…rst-out principle, and what …rm size would be eligible to exclude. The fact that the reform was unexpected, and did not a¤ect the full population of …rms uniformly, make the use of a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach ideal for establishing causal e¤ects 2 .
Four recent studies have used this approach to investigate how the reform a¤ected job ‡ows (von Below and Skogman Thoursie, 2010); labor productivity (Bjuggren, 2013) ; and work absence (Lindbeck et al., 2006; Olsson, 2009 ). Studies in other countries have also used natural experiments to investigate how changes in employment protection legislation a¤ect job ‡ows (Kugler, 2004; Autor et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2007; Martins, 2007) ; employment probabilities for the unemployed (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004; Nicholson and North, 2004) ; the overall employment level (Miles, 2000; Autor et al., 2004 Autor et al., , 2006 Verick, 2004; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008) ; wages (Friesen, 1996; Leonardi and Pica, 2007; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008) ; …rm productivity (Autor et al., 2007; Martins, 2007) ; and work absence (Riphahn, 2004; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) . However, these later studies are most often based on data from countries, usually the United States, where no last-in-…rst-out principle is enforced.
We …nd that …rms with 5-9 employees increased their number of employees with 0.16 relative to our control group after the reform, which corresponds to more than 4,000 additional jobs created per year in the post-reform period. We also …nd that …rms with 10 employees, i.e., just beneath the sizethreshold, refrained from new hiring, presumably because they would then be subject to the stricter rule. The last-in-…rst-out principle thus seem to act as a …rm growth barrier, suggesting that increases in the size-threshold, or removal of the principle completely, could provide new job opportunities and increase overall employment.
The next section provides a more thorough description of Swedish employment protection legislation. Theory and hypotheses to be tested, as well as previous empirical studies, are described in Section 3, while data and our empirical models are presented in Section 4. Results from the di¤erence-indi¤erence estimations can be found in Section 5, while Section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.
Employment protection in Sweden
Job protection for workers older than 45 has existed since 1971 in Sweden, and even further back there were legal restrictions on dismissal of state employees and those that were pregnant or performed military service. The Swedish employment protection legislation received its current form in 1974 when the Social Democratic government passed the Employment Protection Act. The aim was primarily to protect employees against unfair dismissal, as well as ‡uctuations in income, by limiting possibilities for …rms to lay-o¤ employees. It also included rules concerning the use of temporary employees (Skedinger, 2008) .
The current formulation (SFS 1982:80) states that employment contracts are by default permanent, with up to six-months trial periods. Temporary contracts are only allowed if justi…ed by the nature of the work, and then for a maximum of six months. Firms must also apply the last-in-…rst-out principle when dismissing permanent personnel, so that the employee with the least seniority has to be the …rst lay-o¤. This individual must then receive priority in case of hiring during the following nine months.
However, there are a number of ways for employers to circumvent these rules. In speci…c cases, …rms can usually negotiate with their labor union to deviate from the last-in-…rst-out principle, which can be preferable to lay-o¤ a key employee, even though it might mean a higher lay-o¤ cost. Depending on the union involved, workers may also be divided into groups according to the nature of their work, with the last-in-…rst-out principle only applying within each group. Union contracts may also agree upon other deviations from the last-in-…rst-out principle.
Another way to circumvent the principle, is to use temporary employees, who by de…nition do not fall under the last-in-…rst-out principle. Finally, …rms can hire employees through a temporary employment agency. The lastin-…rst-out principle is then not applicable to the …rm, since the employees have permanent contracts with the agency.
It is thus debated how e¢ cient the last-in-…rst-out rule is in reality in protecting individuals against dismissal. Skogman Thoursie (2009), for example, argued that the last-in-…rst-out principle in practice is ine¢ cient since there are so many possibilities for …rms to circumvent it. However, small …rms do not have the same possibilities, since they are less likely to have collective agreements and to hire through temporary employment agencies.
The Swedish employment protection legislation is one of the strictest in the world (OECD, 1994) , with the last-in-…rst-out principle quite uncommon Because of the timing and the unusual -and fragile -cooperation in Parliament between the Green Party and the center-right opposition which passed it, as well as the late change in the threshold for exclusion, it is unlikely that the reform was anticipated by Swedish …rms (Lindbeck et al., 2006) . Thus, we consider this an exogenous change in Swedish employment protection, making it possible to evaluate the causal e¤ect of the reform on …rm growth. The reform applies at …rm level, and not establishment level, to make sure that the exclusion of two employees is independent of the number of establishments within the …rm. However, managers, members of the employer's family, and workers participating in employment-subsidy programs are not counted when determining the size of the …rm. But no di¤erence is made between permanent and temporary employees. Using …rm-level micro data, Bjuggren (2013) analyzed e¤ects on labor productivity, …nding an increase of about 2.5 percent for the treatment group relative to the control group, or 6 percent when the samples were restricted to downsizing …rms that stayed within either the treatment or the control group during the study period.
Finally, using matched employee-employer data from all Swedish …rms, von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) analyzed e¤ects on employment decisions within the …rm. Their results indicated that both hirings and …rings increased by about 5 percent, while no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on net employment levels was found.
3 Employment protection legislation and employment growth
Theory and hypotheses
Though highly researched, employment protection legislation remains a highly controversial topic. Some researchers have argued that potential costs are justi…ed by the need to protect employees from unfair dismissal. Employment protection may also encourage employees to acquire …rm-speci…c human capital, increasing their productivity (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2001 ). On the other hand, employment protection might reduce hirings since it makes a possible future dismissal more expensive (Skedinger, 2011) . Lindbeck (1993) even argues that stricter protection might lead to more permanent unemployment following a depression (see also Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . If Sweden's last-in-…rst-out principle reduces hiring, then, after the 2001 reform, …rms with less than ten employees might have been more likely than those in the control group to hire an additional employee. But since employment protection makes both hiring and dismissing more costly, it is not clear what the net e¤ect would be when that protection was loosened, more employment or less (Bertola, 1999) . Stricter employment protection leads to fewer dismissals during a recession, but fewer hirings during recovery, making the combined e¤ect over the business cycle ambiguous.
However, Swedish policy makers implemented the 2001 reform in hopes of increasing job creation. Since theory is ambigious, our …rst hypothesis -based simply on policy -is H1 Firms with less than ten employees increased their number of employees more than did larger ones after being granted the power to exclude two employees from the last-in-…rst-out principle.
Small …rms might be more sensitive to the cost-increasing e¤ects of employment protection than are larger …rms. But exempting them from stricter employee protection could also provide them with an incentive to remain below the size-threshold, where they would become subject to stricter rules (Skedinger, 2011) . Our second hypothesis is therefore H2 After the 2001 reform, …rms with ten employees became less likely than …rms with nine to increase their number of employees.
Empirical studies
In recent decades, several countries have reformed employment protection for small …rms but not for larger ones (Portugal in 1989; Italy in 1990; Germany in 1996 Germany in , 1999 Germany in , and 2004 and Sweden in 2001) , creating natural experiments that, as noted, have been used to investigate their e¤ects.
Prior to 1990, Italian …rms with less than 15 employees were exempted from employment protection, but a sudden reform removed this exemption. Kugler and Pica (2003, 2008) , Cingano et al. (2010) , and Garibaldi et al. (2004) found that both hirings and dismissals were reduced more in small …rms than in larger ones following the reform, and Schivardi and Torrini (2004) found that average …rm size increased by almost 1 percent.
Politicians in Germany have also implemented employment protection legislation reforms. Bauernschuster (2009) found that hirings, but not dis-missals, increased when dismissal protection in small …rms was relaxed under the German 2004 reform, resulting in a net positive e¤ect on employment.
Firms also became more likely than before to hire employees on permanent rather than temporary contracts.
The 1989 Portuguese reform, which loosened employment protection for …rms with at most twenty employees, increased employment levels in small …rms relative to larger ones, but the e¤ect was small (Martins, 2009) . Permanent employees in …rms with looser employment protection were then more likely to be dismissed (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005) , but no threshold e¤ect on …rm growth was found.
Comparing these results is not straight forward because the reforms differed in many ways. In any case, none of the studies concern exemptions from a last-in-…rst-out-rule, which does not exist in those countries.
Cross-state di¤erences of employment protection legislation in the United States, or cross-country di¤erences elsewhere (Autor et al., 2004 (Autor et al., , 2006 (Autor et al., , 2007 , have also been used to investigate its e¤ects on net employment levels. In general, stricter employment protection has been found to reduce both hirings and dismissals. However, most reforms have lacked treatment and control groups, complicating evaluation. Results might thus be driven by omitted variables correlated with the reforms, which themselves might have been driven by employment trends.
Data and empirical method 4.1 Data
Limited liability …rms in Sweden are required to submit an annual report to the Swedish patent and registration o¢ ce (PRV). The dataset we use includes all variables found in the annual reports, -i.e., measures of pro…ts, number of employees, salaries, …xed costs, and liquidity -gathered from PRV by PAR, (a Swedish consulting …rm) on limited liability …rms active at some point during 1996-2010. We focus on limited liability …rms since they tend to have higher growth, and growth ambitions than other legal forms (Storey, 1994; Harho¤ et al., 1998 ).
We use …rm-level data since, as noted the exemption from last-in-…rst-out was applied at …rm-level, not on establishment-level. Firms with less than 5 or more than 16 employees were excluded to avoid having too large di¤erences between the treatment and the control groups. The …nal sample then consists of 47,896 …rms, and 169,353 …rm-year observations.
Truncating the treatment group -excluding …rms with 1-4 employeeswill bias the results upwards if some …rms fall out of the group during the study period. On the other hand, truncating the control group -excluding …rms with 16 or more employees -will bias the results downward if some …rms grow out of the group during the study period, and hopefully the two biases will cancel each other. There was little movement between the groups either before or after the reform 3 , and no obvious di¤erences in the distribution of …rms by size-class before and after the reform (Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 1 about here]
Another potential problem is that after the reform, …rms could self-select into treatment, which would reduce our estimate of the treatment e¤ect.
However, the reform was quite sudden, and reducing employee numbers takes time. To minimize the possibility of this behavior a¤ecting our results, we restrict the number of post-reform years to three 4 .
When investigating …rms growth, researchers need to choose the growth indicator, type of growth measurement, and process of growth they are interested in (Delmar and Davidsson, 1998) . The growth indicator refers to the variable over which growth is observed. The most commonly used growth indicators are employment and sales Davidsson, 1998, Daunfeldt et al., 2014) . Although they tend to be only modestly correlated (Shepherd and Wiklund, 2009; Coad, 2010) , most studies suggest that the results are not very sensitive to which is chosen (Daunfeldt et al., 2014) . We use employment as growth indicator since our purpose is to study the e¤ects of the last-in-…rst-out principle on employment.
Researchers also need to choose the type of growth measurement, i.e., whether growth is measured absolute, or relative, both of which can be biased. Relative-growth measures tend to favor small …rms due to regression to the mean, whereas absolute measures tend to favor large …rms (Delmar et al., 2003) . We focus on absolute changes since the aim of relaxing employment protection legislation is to increase the total number of employees, not relative growth rates 5 . Any bias in favor of large …rms will result in a more conservative estimate of the reform e¤ect.
Finally, researchers need to choose the process of growth they are interested in, organic (new hiring internal to the …rm) or acquired (gaining employees through external acquisitions mergers). Due to lack of data on mergers and acquisitions, most studies use total growth (the sum of organic and acquired growth), as do we.
We thus de…ne …rm growth (G i;t ) for …rm i during period t as the absolute change in the total number of employees,
A …rm replacing one worker with another would have zero growth, which means that this de…nition captures the net e¤ect on employment.
The probability that a company hires an additional employee was lower during the 3 years after the reform, than before, especially for …rms at the ten-employee threshold (Figure 2 ). Growth for …rms with 10 employees is around 3.4 percentage points lower than one would expect, indicating that the incentive to grow has been reduced for …rms close to the threshold size.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The probability of hiring an additional employee is increasing in …rm size, i.e., smaller …rms are much less likely to grow than are larger ones, con…rming their lower growth ambitions (Nightingale and Coad, 2014) . We therefore restrict our treatment group to …rms with 5-9 employees, and separately analyze …rms with just 9 or 10 employees. The likelihood of …rms having 9 or 10 employees prior to the reform is presumable more or less random, but afterward …rms with 10 employees can no longer grow without passing the exclusion threshold. Di¤erences in employment growth after the reform are thus probably related to introduction of the threshold.
Empirical method
We …rst test Hypothesis 1 -that …rms with 5-9 employees increased their number of employees more than did larger ones after being granted the power to exclude two from the last-in-…rst-out principle -by estimating D g is a dummy for belonging to the treatment group; S i;t 1 is total revenue in period t 1; Age i;t is …rm age; I j and R m , and T v are industryspeci…c, regional-speci…c, and time-speci…c …xed e¤ects. Industry-speci…c and region-speci…c …xed e¤ects control for whether employment growth is determined by time-invariant heterogeneity across industries and regions, while time-speci…c …xed e¤ects control for time-variant heterogeneity (e.g., business cycle e¤ects) that might explain di¤erences in employment growth.
Interaction terms capturing industry-speci…c and region-speci…c time-trends are also included.
Our key variable of interest is the interaction between D t and D g ; which provides an estimate of the treatment e¤ect. We expect b 3 > 0, i.e., that …rms with 5-9 employees increased their number of employees after the reform more than did …rms with 11-15 employees, i.e., …rms above the exclusion threshold.
We control for …rm age and size since they are usually included as controls in the …rm growth literature (van Praag & Versloot, 2008) . Many empirical studies have tested Gibrat's (1931) proposition that …rm-growth is independent of …rm size (Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998) . Recent studies tend to reject this hypothesis, instead …nding that small …rms grow faster than larger ones (Coad, 2009 ). Some studies have also found that younger …rms grow faster than older ones. In fact, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) found that there may be no systematic relationship between …rm size and …rm growth after controlling for …rm age.
Using a linear probability model, we then test Hypothesis 2 -that, after the 2001 reform, …rms with ten employees are less likely than …rms with nine employees to grow -by estimating
where DG i;t is a binary dependent variable equaling one if …rm i had positive growth in period t, otherwise zero. We expect b 3 < 0, i.e., that …rms with 10 employees grow less than did …rms with 9 employees after the reform, so that they can maintain their ability to exclude two key employees in event of lay-o¤s.
Results
When using di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation, a key assumption is that the outcome variables would have had parallel trends for the treatment and control groups after the reform in the absence of treatment. This is not formally testable, but Figure 4 shows the trends in absolute employment growth for …rms in a neighborhood below the exclusion threshold (5-9 employees) and above it (11-15 employees), before and after the reform. The results indicate that trends were similar before the reform.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Our results when estimating Equation (2) are presented in Table 1 [ Table 1 about here] To reduce any problem of self-selection into the treatment group, we alternatively excluded more observations near the exclusion threshold, including …rms with 5-7 and 13-15 employees in the treatment and control groups, respectively. The estimated treatment e¤ect was then slightly smaller (0.15), see Table A3 in the Appendix.
Four similar models are also estimated based on Equation (3), testing whether …rms with ten employees are less likely than …rms with nine to increase their workforce after the reform (Table 2) . Firms with ten employees are thus our treatment group, whereas …rms with nine constitutes our control group, reducing our dataset to 31,207 …rm-year observations.
[ Table 2 about here] After the reform, …rms with ten employees would exceed the non-exemption threshold if they added an employee. Such …rms were also found to be 3.4 percentage points less likely to add an employee after the reform than were …rms with nine employees. This implies that …rms with ten employees wanted to maintain their ability to exclude two key employees in event of lay-o¤s, and that the size-threshold thus hindered …rms from growing.
Previous studies have found that the 2001 reform of the Swedish employment protection legislation led to a number of other positive e¤ects such as reduced sickness absence (Lindbeck et al., 2006; Olsson, 2009) , increased …rm productivity (Bjuggren, 2013) , and more job dynamics (von Below and Skogman Thoursie, 2010).
Our results di¤er from von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010), who found no e¤ect on net employment. One reason might be that we included …rms with 5-9 employees in the treatment group instead of …rms with 2-10 employees. Finding causal e¤ect with di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation depends on the treatment and control groups being as similar as possible so that the treatment can be regarded as randomly assigned. But …rms with 2 employees di¤er signi…cantly from …rms with 11 employees, not least with regard to growth ambitions (Figure 3 ; Nightingale and Coad, 2014) .
They also used a relative growth measure, changes in hiring and dismissal relative to total number of employees as their dependent variable, while we used the absolute number of employees within the …rm. We believe our measure is preferable since …rms seeking to grow usually de…ne the number of additional employees they want to hire, rather than targeting some percentage of growth.
However, we found a net positive e¤ect on employment even when …rms with 2-4 employees were included in our treatment group, and our results
were qualitatively similar even when we used a relative growth measure (results available upon request). Possibly our results di¤er from those of von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) because our study was restricted to limited liability …rms, whereas they also included public …rms and sole proprietorships. Their not …nding an e¤ect on net employment might thus be driven by di¤erent behavioral responses of …rms with di¤erent legal status.
We believe that future research should look more carefully at how the reform in ‡uenced di¤erent groups of potential employees in the labor market.
Employers may be less likely to hire applicants who are considered risky -for example, those with less work experience, with foreign education or long time unemployed -when employment protection is restrictive (Kugler and SaintPaul, 2004 ). This could lead to higher unemployment among those groups (Skedinger, 2010) . Seniority rules (such as the last-in-…rst out) bene…t older native-born workers more than younger ones or immigrants. The e¤ect of the reform could thus also di¤er across industries, since the last-in-…rst-out principle might hinder growth more in those which tend to hire the young and immigrants.
Employment protection reforms might also in ‡uence how …rms grow, not just how much they grow. Future studies should therefore investigate whether mergers and acquisitions are in ‡uenced by reforms intended to reduce hindrances to growth.
We know that many …rms do not grow, despite high pro…tability. It thus becomes important to investigate whether it is growth barriers that prevents them from growing. If this is the case, many more jobs could be created if these barriers were removed. There may be other possible hindrances to growth -besides the last-in-…rst-out principle -and we believe that future studies should consider if it exist other natural experiments that can be used to analyze their e¤ects on …rm growth.
1. We exclude …rms with 10 employees from the analysis since they are in the treatment group but would move beyond it with a new hiring.
2. If the reform was unexpected, we would not see an e¤ect before 2001.
To test this, we perform placebo estimations with hypothetical reform years. Our results indicate no e¤ects of the hypothetic reform years on employment growth, and are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
3. We investigate this by calculating transition probabilities. Our results are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix.
4. We have also tried restricting the study period to two years. The results are qualitatively similar, and available from the authors upon request.
5. We cannot distinguish between permanent and temporary employees. This is not a problem when de…ning …rm size, for which purpose the legislation includes both, but the last-in-…rst-out rule only applies to permanent employees.
6. We also estimated all models without time-, industry-, and regionalspeci…c …xed e¤ects. All results remained qualitatively similar, and are available from the authors upon request. Table 1 (Table A1 ). In order to reduce problems with hypothetical treatment years overlapping the true reform year, the estimations in Table A1 is based on only one year before and one year after the hypothetical treatment years. This also explains why no trends are included. No signi…cant e¤ects of the hypothetical reforms were found, indicating that the 2001 reform was unexpected by …rms.
When doing placebo estimations for the threshold e¤ect given hypothetical reform years (Table A2) , it is not possible to limit to only one year before and after. Just as on Tables 1 and 2 , we therefore used three years before and after the hypothetical reforms. Due to limitaions in the data, the estimation using 1999 as reform year only includes two years before and after the reform, which is why the dummy variable for the treatment period is omitted.
Though smaller than the e¤ect of the true reform in 2001, a statistically signi…cant e¤ect for a hypothetical reform in year 2000 is found. But this is not surprising, since two out of the three hypothetical treatment years are actual treatment years when …rms with less than ten employees in fact received treatment.
To reduce the probability of e¤ects from self-selection into the treatment group after the reform, we also excluded …rms close to the size-threshold so that the treatment group consists of …rms with 5-7 employees, and the control group of …rms with 13-15 employees. The estimated treatment e¤ects is slightly smaller than in the standard model shown in Table 1 . (Table A4 , D9 D t ) or …rms with 10 vs. 11 (Table A4 , D11 D t ), and this is indeed the case, which strengthens our conclusion that the treatment e¤ects observed for 9 vs. 10 employees (Table A4 , D10 D t ) were driven by the reform. Since self-selection into the treatment group after the reform is possible, we also analyze movements between groups by calculating transition probabilities (Table A5 ). The probability of staying in the original group is high in both periods, 0.87-0.90 in the pre-reform period and 0.84-0.93 in the post-reform period. The probabilities of moving from the treatment group to the control group is similar those of moving oppositely. Firms became somewhat less likely to move from the treatment group to the control group after the reform (0.07), whereas the opposite result is found for the control group (0.16). However, it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding causal e¤ects just from this.
